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ASYMMETRICAL CAUSATION AND
CRIMINAL DESISTANCE
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN* AND IRVING PILIAVIN"
Although criminologists have long been concerned with desistance or cessation from crime,' tests of theory are typically
based on etiological investigations.2 Desistance studies, in contrast, have historically been used for program evaluations, undertaken by professionals in social work, clinical psychology,
and corrections. We argue that theory and research on desistance is absolutely critical to advancing scientific and policy
goals. We do not attempt to break new theoretical or empirical
ground in this paper, but instead present a systematic explication of the argument for desistance research.

University of Minnesota, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology.
University of Wisconsin, Professor Emeritus, Departments of Sociology & Social
Work. We are indebted to Chuck Halaby for introducing us to the Rubin/Holland
model, Jennifer Pierce and Joachim Savelsberg for their thoughtful comments, Sara
Wakefield andJessica Huiras for research assistance and MelissaJampol and the editors of this journal for facilitating the publication process. Any remaining errors or
unqualified assertions remain the responsibility of the authors.
I See SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS 257
(1930) [hereinafter GLUECK & GLUECK, 500 CRiMINAL CAREERS]; SHELDON GLUECK &
ELEANOR T. GLUECK, LATER CRIMINAL CAREERS 98 (1937) [hereinafter GLUECK &
GLUECK, LATER CRIMINAL CAREERS]; EDWIN S. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY

357-58 (rd ed. 1939).
For exceptions, see Liliana E. Pezzin, Earnings Prospects, MatchingEffects, and the
Decision to Terminate a Criminal Career, 11 J. OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 29, 29-30

(1995); Neil Shover & Carol Y. Thompson, Age, DifferentialExpectations, and Crime Desistance, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 89, 89-90 (1992); Thomas Meisenhelder, An Exploratory Study
of Exitingfrom Criminal Careers, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 319, 319-20 (1977); Thomas Meisenhelder, Becoming Normal: Certiwation as a Stage in Exiting from Crime, 3 DEVIANT
BEHAVIOR 137, 146-47 (1982).
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I. CAUSAL ASYMMETRY, CRIME, AND DESISTANCE
A. THE GROWING UNIVERSE OF POTENTIAL DESISTERS

Though ex-offenders are socially marginalized in America,
they are no longer a statistically marginal group. As of December 31, 1997, American state and federal prisons held 1,244,554
prisoners, with over 500,000 additional inmates held in local
jails.3

Despite recent increases in mandatory minimum and

mandatory life sentences, almost all of these prisoners will eventually rejoin civil society.4 Each year, several hundred thousand
releasees pour into the general population, with over 400,000
entering parole in 1997.5 In fact, over the past twenty-five years
the trends in prison release closely mirror rising incarceration
rates. Figure 1 plots the number of U.S. prisoners incarcerated
and the number of prisoners released each year. As the figure
indicates, the two data series are correlated quite closely (r=.98).
In fact, more prisoners were released in 1996 than were incarcerated in 1986 and more than twice as many were released in
1996 as were incarcerated in 1976. Some of these released prisoners will resume crime and others will desist from crime-they
will temporarily or permanently cease offending--yet little is
known about the desistance process. This paper argues that a
research program to identify the causes of desistance will advance both scientific and policy concerns.
Despite a longstanding concern within the discipline,
criminologists today devote relatively little attention to deriving
theoretical understanding of the desistance process. This is because criminological theory and research are primarily concerned with questions of etiology, or the causes of crime.
Darrell K. Gilliard & Allen

J.

Beck, Prisoners in 1997, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE

STATISTIcS BULLETIN 1 (1998).
JOHN IRWIN &JAMES AUSTIN, IT'S ABOUT TIME: AMERICA'S IMPRISONMENT BINGE 161
(2d ed. 1997).
THoMAs P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE POPULATIONS
4 (1998).
6The data in Figure 1 are taken from SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS
1995, at 560 (1996) published by the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice
Statistics for the years 1973-1996. These data may also be found in the Bureau ofJustice Statistics series CORRECIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (1996).
4
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Discipline-based criminologists such as sociologists, psychologists, and economists have focused their attention on etiological
research addressing individual involvement in crime or community crime rates. Unfortunately, the study of these phenomena is conceptually complex, fraught with daunting
methodological barriers, and in many (though not all) ways,
without policy relevance. Desistance research may prove more
rewarding for theory and policy, in part because it is more manageable conceptually and methodologically.
In this paper, we are less concerned with why people commit crime than with the conditions promoting social reintegration and desistance from crime. We make the following
assertions: (1) that the causes of desistance likely differ from the
causes of crime; (2) that knowledge of the true causes of desistance will be easier to obtain than knowledge of the true causes
of crime; and (3) that it will be possible to translate scientific
knowledge about desistance into specific policy interventions.
We begin with a general discussion of crime and causality, then
present the case for and against desistance research.
B. CRIMINOLOGICAL PROBLEMS POSED BY THE RUBIN/HOLLAND
CAUSAL MODEL

As social scientists researching crime and conformity, we often set out to make causal inferences. Temporal order, statistical association, and lack of spuriousness are generally accepted
as minimal criteria for establishing causality in the social sciences,7 though these standards are rarely approached in practice. In the study of delinquency, for example, we continue to
debate the putative causes: are delinquent friends causes or
consequences of involvement in crime? Does family alienation
precede or follow from one's involvement with delinquent
peers? Definitive answers to such questions are elusive because
of both conceptual confusion over the meaning of causality and
7 See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Foreword to HERBERT HYMAN, SURVEY DESIGN AND ANALYSIS at

xiv (1955); TRAVIS HIRSCHI & HANAN C. SELVIN, DELINQUENCY RESEARCH: AN APPRAISAL

OF ANALYTiC METHODS 52-53 (1967); but see Margaret Mooney Marini & Burton Singer,
Causality in the Social Sciences, in Soc. METHODOLOGY 347, 376-79 (Clifford C. Clogg
ed., 1988); and Huw Price, Agency and CausalAsymmetry, 101 MIND 501, 511 (1992), on
temporal order.
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operational difficulties implementing critical tests of theoretical
propositions.
Rubin8 and Holland offer a statistical model of causal inference that lays. bare the obstacles to establishing causation in
criminology. The Rubin/Holland model highlights the difficulties in establishing the causes of crime and illustrates the potential for desistance research. The central prescription of the
model is to seek the effects of manipulable causes rather than to
trace the causes of observed effects. They arrive at this conclusion in the following manner:
Holland defines a true causal effect of some factor T on response variable Y for individual unit U as
Y,(U) -Y,.(u)l°

This difference implies that the effect of any cause T must
always be assessed in relation to some other cause, the counterfactual condition not-T or C. The fundamental problem of
causal inference, in criminological research as elsewhere, is that
it is impossible to observe the value of Y,(U) and Y(u) on the
same individual person or "unit." If a respondent is employed
at age fifteen and commits delinquency at age sixteen, for example, we cannot determine whether she would have committed
delinquency had she not been working. Because we can only
observe one condition per unit, we face a missing data problem
for the counter-factual condition. Holland distinguishes between scientific and statistical solutions to this problem. Both
have been applied in criminological research.
1. Scientiflc Solutions
Among the scientific solutions, one can attempt to assure
(or simply assume) that each individual unit is identical (assuming unit homogeneity) and submit unit one to treatment T and
' Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causual Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies, 66J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 688, 689-90 (1974).
' Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 945, 946
(1986).
'oId, at 947.
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unit two to treatment C. If so, then the true causal effect is easily obtained as:
YI(U,) - Y,(u2)
Alternatively, if it is reasonable to believe that prior exposure does not affect subsequent response, the scientist could
expose the same unit to each treatment in succession (assuming
temporalstability and causal transience).
YT(TE2) (U)

- YC(TIIE, (U,)

Although such assumptions may be reasonable in laboratory
work, they are rarely justified in criminological research: humans are not identical in all relevant respects, and human responses are neither constant over time nor unaffected by
previous exposures. To continue the previous example, we
cannot assume that a working teen is identical in all relevant respects to a non-working teen, for workers may be more ambitious, less impulsive, or more opportunistic than non-workers.
Nor can we assume that exposure to work in eighth grade will
have the same effects as exposure to work in tenth grade, or, for
that matter, that working in eighth grade will not affect one's
response to non-work in tenth grade. Therefore, as social scientists we must often rely on a statistical solution to the inference
problem.
2. StatisticalSolutions
The Rubin/Holland statistical solution is to find the expected value (E) of the average causal effect T, of T (relative to
C) over a population U, or
E (Y, -Y) =T
which can be expressed as
T = E(Y) - E(Y,)

1998]

CA USA TION & CRMINAL DESISTANCE

1405

To continue the earlier example, one could deviate the average number of crimes (or the proportion committing a
crime) among workers from the average number of crimes
among non-workers. This replaces the unobservable causal effect of T on a specific unit with an estimate of the average causal
effect of T over a population of units. Unfortunately, this approach breaks down in practice because an important assumption is unlikely to hold.
3. The Mean Independence Assumption

For the statistical solution to hold, we must assume mean independence the mean values on Y for the T group and the C
group must be independent of the selection or assignment
mechanism (S) that determines whether YT or Y, is observed for
any given unit. In general, mean independence fails in criminology and other social sciences and the observed average
treatment effect T(0o) is not equivalent to the true treatment ef-

fect T n"
TWO

= E(YTIS=T)

- E(YcIS=c)

The mean independence assumption for groups is thus
analogous to the unit homogeneity assumption for units. Both
allow the comparison of observed quantities with latent or unobserved quantities. Only when Y, and Y, are both mean independent of S, however, does
E(Y,) = E(YTIS=T)

and

E(Y,) = E(Y=IS=c)

So that

T=T O) = E (Y) - E(Y)
In short, the two conditional means E(YIS=T) and E
(YIS=c) must be independent for them both to equal the un" Holland distinguishes between a "prima facie" cause T, and the true average
causal effect T. Id. at 949.
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conditional mean E(YT)12 If the selection mechanism S is randomized assignment to employment, this is a reasonable assumption for the work and crime example above. If S is selfselection, however, this assumption is invalid: those that selfselect into employment are likely to have lower crime means
than those that self-select out of employment. If selection is
partially determined by "ambition" and ambition is associated
with crime, for example, the conditional distributions are unequal and the mean independence assumption breaks down.
This is simply one important variant of the more general omitted variable problem that biases parameter estimates. Criminology is particularly vulnerable to violations of mean
independence, however, because the selection processes into
levels of our independent and dependent variables are so poorly
understood.

point becomes clear when expressed in terms of conditional probabilities.
The expected value for the treatment group is composed of two parts, the mean if assigned to treatment and the mean if assigned to control. The first quantity is the
product of the expected value of the mean for the treatment group and the probability of selection into that group. The second quantity is the unobserved mean for the
counterfactual (the mean the controls would have had, were they assigned to treatment) multiplied by the probability of selection into the counterfactual, or control
status.
2 This

E(Y,) = E(YTIS=T)P(S=T) + E(YTS=C)P(S=c)

Similarly, the expected value for the control group is:
E(Y=) = E(YcIS=c)P(S=c) + E(YJS=T)P(S=T)
The expected values for both treatment and control groups are thus weighted averages of the observed and counterfactual conditions. By substituting these quantities
into the expression T = E(Y) - E(Y¢), we obtain
T = E(YjIS=T)P(S=T) + [E(YTIS=c)P(S=c)] - E(Y=jS=c)P(S=c) - [E(Y¢IS=T)P(S=T)]
Of course, we only observe Y when a unit selects into the treatment condition and
we only observe Y when a unit selects into the control condition, computing T(..) as
follows:
Tom) = E(YTIS=T) - E(YJIS=c)

To determine the true rather than the observed causal effect, we need information
about the unknown (and unknowable) counterfactual conditions. If the mean of Y is
independent of the assignment mechanism S, however, then
E(YIS=T) = E(YJS=C) = E(Y) and E(YIS=C) = E(YjIS=T) = E(Y)
so that
T = To),= E(YT,) - E(Y)
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4. Selection Mechanisms and StrongIgnorability.
When researchers cannot control the assignment mechanism (S), as in observational studies of delinquency, causal inference requires "strong ignorability" to assure mean
independence. 13 For a selection mechanism to be strongly ignorable: (1) all factors related to both the treatment and nontreatment condition must be included as covariates; (2) all units
must have a non-zero probability of assignment to treatment
and non-treatment conditions; and (3) a unit's response to
treatment must not be affected by either the assignment
14
mechanism or the treatments other units receive. These conditions require much more exhaustive data and much more
painstaking analysis than are usually conducted in etiological
studies of crime and delinquency. Each variable of causal interest must be fastidiously examined. In the example above, we
would have to pay at least as much attention to the process by
which young people find jobs as we would to the effects of jobs
on crime. We would also need theory and data regarding factors such as peer associates, success or failure in school, parental
supervision, and myriad other indicators likely to be related to
both processes. In sum, Berk's contention that strong ignorability may be a "pipe dream" in observational research is particu15
larly true for the study of crime.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORYAND POLICY ON CRIME
To determine causality, then, the model requires at minimum a random or strongly ignorable assignment mechanism
and treatments that can (at least in principle) be manipulated.
We argue that these conditions are unlikely to hold in etiological research on crime. In desistance analysis, however, both
random selection mechanisms and manipulable interventions
are much more feasible: a researcher can randomly assign to (or
deny from) offenders a range of treatment modalities-a range
" Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, Reducing Bias in Observation Studies Using
Subclassification on the Propensity Score, 79J. AM. STAT. ASS'N. 516, 522 (1984).
4

Richard A. Berk, CausalInferencefor SociologicalData, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY

155, 161 (NeilJ. Smelser ed., 1988).
'5Id. at 165.
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of putative causes. She then can observe the effects of these
causes relative to some other cause, presumably assignment to a
control condition.
A. DISADVANTAGES OF NON-EXPERIMENTAL ETIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

In nonexperimental social research, we typically attempt to
assure mean independence using covariate adjustment for factors likely to be related to both the putative cause and the selecdon process. As Sobel points out, if researchers can "name and
measure the covariates that account for assignment" to a condition, then its conditional average effects are estimable from the
data.16 Unfortunately, we often do not know which factors must
be statistically controlled to render the selection mechanism
strongly ignorable. Even when we can identify such variables,
they are subject to measurement error. Until we have much
more refined conceptual models of selection into our independent variables, a safer alternative is to manipulate them as part of
the research design.
As regards the dependent variables, there remains confusion
over the appropriate domain of behavior in etiological research:
how do we compare studies of involvement in minor crime with
those investigating more serious, sustained, or socially harmful
criminal behavior? How can we make causal interpretations
when studies fail to distinguish entrance from continuation in
crime, particularly since entrance appears to be virtually universal? The primary problem is one of endogeneity--isolating the
true effects of factors that cannot be manipulated by the researcher.
1. Accountingfor Selection

How can criminologists account for the selection mechanism and make causal interpretations when etiological studies
of crime are beset by endogeneity? Perhaps the most promising

" Michael E. Sobel, An Introduction to Causal Inference, 24 SoC.
RESEARcH 353, 367 (1996).

METHODS

&

1998]

CA USA TION & CRIMINAL DESISTANCE

1409

approach is to examine within-person changes in offending.
Still, even models that purport to control for individual differences can only account for stable within-unit differences. For
example, it is common in econometrics to adjust for unobserved
heterogeneity in pooled time-series analysis with fixed-effects
models in which each variable is expressed as a deviation from
its mean value. Unfortunately, such estimators are inappropriate when crime is not exogenously determined or a reciprocal
causal relationship is suspected. 8 If the past level of the dependent variable (crime) has a causal effect on subsequent levels of the independent variable (employment), this violates the
assumption of "strict exogeneity."' 9 Therefore, although good

longitudinal data and analytic techniques enable researchers to
statistically control for unmeasured stable differences, these
models only correct for selectivity and omitted variable biases to
the extent that the relevant unobservables are person-specific
and fixed over time. Ethnographic and interview data, however,
suggest that this assumption may be mistaken: offenders' perceptions and normative orientations evolve with age and lifecourse transitions, as does the social and historical context in
which they find themselves. 0
2. ManipulableTreatments

Although etiological studies have led to elegant tests of
criminological theory,21 their implications suggest interventions
that are often unworkable for public policy. Neither the re17SeeJulie Homey et al., Criminal Careers in the Short-term: Intra-IndividualVariability
and its Relation to Local Life Circumstances,60 AM. Soc. REV. 655, 657 (1995).
in Crime
, 8David R. Johnson, Alternative Methods for the QuantitativeAnalysis of Panel Data in

Family Research:Pooled Time-Series Models, 57J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1065, 1071 (1994).
,"Id.; see also Michael P. Keane & David E. Runkle, On the Estimation of Panel-Data
Models With Serial Correlation When Instruments Are Not Strictly Exogenous, 10 J.Bus. &
ECON. STAT. 1, 3 (1992).
20 See NFiL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS: PURSUITS AND CAREERS OF PERSISTENT

THIEVES 124 (1996).
2"See e.g., John Hagan et al., Class in the Household: A Power-Control Theory of Gender
and Delinquency, 92 AM.J. oF Soc. 788 (1987); Allen E. Liska & Mark D. Reed, Ties to
Conventional Institutions and Delinquency: EstimatingReciprocal Effects, 50 AM. SOC. REV.
547 (1985); Ross L. Matsueda, Testing Control Theoy and Differential Association: A
CausalModeling Approach, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 489 (1982).
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searcher nor the state has the ethical or constitutional license to
radically alter, say, the personality, parental background, neigh22
borhood, or associates of youth identified as "pre-delinquent
who have yet to violate the law. In light of these problems, programs aiming to prevent the onset of delinquency have been
excoriated in the evaluation literature. 3 There are few strong
treatments that a researcher can administer in good conscience,
leaving little room for bold experimentation among such a vulnerable population. Even well-intentioned efforts to increase
opportunities for youth in high-risk groups may have unintended stigmatizing or otherwise deleterious consequences. 24
3. CausalAsymmety
Etiological research has provided many well-established
empirical generalizations, such as the relation between law violation and gender, age, urban residence, mobility, parental attachment, school success, and moral beliefs. 5 Unfortunately,
these findings do not translate neatly into a set of causal maxims
or concrete policy prescriptions to prevent the onset of delinquency or crime. Moreover, we have little reason to believe that
manipulating these factors will alter offending behavior once it
has begun. The failure of programs as wide-ranging as family
therapy, remedial education, reference group alteration, and
psychological counseling suggests that either the presumed
cause is misidentified or that symmetrical causation does not
apply. Of course, the failure of particular policies does not rule
out the possibility that more intensive, more costly, more foSHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, IDENTIFICATION OF PREDELINQUENTS:
VALIDATION STUDIES AND SOME SUGGESTED USES OF THE GLUECK TABLE 1, 9 (Sheldon

Glueck & Eleanor T. Glueck eds., 1972).
One otherwise evenhanded review of programs to prevent or control delinquency
concludes that "Prevention projects don't work and they waste money, violate the rights
ofjuveniles and their families, inspire bizarre suggestions and programs, and fail to affect
the known correlates of urban delinquency."
CONTROL OFJUVENLE DELINQUENCY 245 (1993).

See

RICHARD J. LUNDMAN, PREVENTION AND

35 (1963); LARRY L. ORR ET AL., DOES TRAINING
131-33 (1996).
2 For reviews of this literature see JOHN BRAIrHwAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND
REINTEGRATION 54-97 (1989); MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL
THEORY OF CRIME 123-53 (1990); JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARDJ. HERNSTEIN, CRIME AND
HUMAN NATURE (1985).
24

HOwARD BECKER, OUTSIDERS

FOR THE DISADVANTAGED WORK?
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cused, or more invasive treatments may indeed have the intended prophylactic result. Therefore, we must continue seeking innovative and creative policy interventions. This paper
argues, however, that we must simultaneously begin a more systematic investigation of the causes of desistance.
4. ManipulatingInitial Conditions

We currently lack the information to determine whether the
causes of crime and desistance are symmetrical. The situation is
analogous to the apparent temporal asymmetry in radiative
phenomena observed by Popper: we understand why a stone
tossed into a still pond will produce outgoing concentric waves
on the water's surface, and yet it would strike us as remarkable
to witness a confluence of incoming concentric waves arriving at
just the right moment to launch a stone out of the pond and
into one's hand.26 This could signal some asymmetry in the laws
of thermodynamics or it could simply reflect our relative capacity to manipulate the initial conditions that give rise to each
phenomenon. That is, in the existing world it is much easier to
toss a rock into a pond than to engineer the sort of elaborate
experiment necessary to reverse the process. 27 For the study of
crime and desistance, the situation is analogous: as we argue below, the conditions likely to engender desistance are much
more amenable to manipulation than the conditions likely to
cause crime.
B. ADVANTAGES OF DESISTANCE ANALYSIS

Desistance studies-of drug use, welfare receipt, retirement,
and other phenomena in addition to crime-are much better
situated to guide social policy than etiological studies. The primary advantage of desistance analysis stems from the ability to
randomly assign a target group to a truly exogenous treatment.
Experimental evaluations examining desistance or recidivism
outcomes may provide results that directly translate into policy

27

See Karl R. Popper, The Arrow of Time, 177 NATURE 538 (1956).
See Price, supra note 7, at 504-05.
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prescriptions. 231 Moreover, when interventions are tightly linked
to theory, desistance analysis can provide the sort of critical tests
of criminological theory that have eluded etiological researchers.
1. Temporal Order

Why is this best accomplished in a study of desistance? First,
and perhaps most importantly, the desistance researcher works
in concert with time rather than against it. Although twentiethcentury physics have challenged traditional conceptions of temporal order in causality,2 the arrow of causation typically remains aligned with the arrow of time in the social sciences. In
terms of the Rubin/Holland model, desistance research seeks
the effects of manipulable causes-interventions in the hands of
the researcher-rather than seeking to reconstruct the putative
causes of observed effects. Too often, criminological researchers attempt to enumerate all possible causes of crime in a fruitless attempt to statistically deconstruct naturally occurring
assignment mechanisms. By "controlling for" myriad causes, the
argument goes, researchers hope to render selection strongly
ignorable and get clean estimates of all of them. Instead, we believe with Holland ° and Sobe13 ' that we should carefully examine the effect of particularcauses by consciously manipulating
them.
2. A License to Intervene

The difficulties in etiological research are a matter of both
logical and pragmatic considerations-of both causal sequencing and the authority to act. Where and how (and when) can we
best craft and apply an intervention so that we may examine its
consequences? Our ability to isolate the true causal effect of
critical etiological factors such as parents, schools, and neigh28PETER H. RossI ET AL., MONEY, WORK, AND CRIME: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 277
(1980); JUDITH M. GUERON & EDWARD PAULY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK 29 (1991); ORR
ETAL., supra note 24, at 211.

Price, supranote 7, at 512.
Holland, supra note 9, at 959 (1986).
Sobel, supra note 16, at 373.
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borhoods is constrained by our inability to manipulate the selection mechanisms guiding their allocation. For both social scientific research and for policy purposes, manipulation of these
factors is unacceptably invasive in a democratic society. The researcher conducting a desistance study has a more legitimate
and expansive license to intervene in the lives of participants. This
means that she can provide, or perhaps more importantly, deny
a particular program to a treatment and a control group. Of
course constitutional and ethical concerns do not disappear in
desistance programs; some inmates may be falsely accused and
imprisoned, the victims of an imperfect criminal justice system.
Nevertheless, participants have all been convicted of crimes, or
in the case of juveniles, adjudicated delinquent. We may certainly provide or deny employment, for example. Although we
do not advocate random assignment to marriage, we can certainly manipulate causal interventions that are designed to enhance marital quality or stability through financial,
psychological, or behavioral counseling and support.
3. Target Efficiency

Finally, desistance strategies are better able to concentrate
resources on specific target groups likely to benefit from them.
Primary prevention programs, in contrast, must cast a much
wider net that is liable to include a large number of nonoffenders (or offenders who commit only trivial offenses). For
policy, this means that programs designed to foster desistance
may bring a greater return to investments in released offenders--a greater potential to reduce the social harm associated
with recidivism. For science, this means that desistance analysis
offers potentially greater efficiencies in design and statistical
analysis.
C. REAL AND IMAGINED DISADVANTAGES OF DESISTANCE ANALYSIS

1. Devising Theoretically Relevant Interventions

In our view, the major weakness in existing desistance research has been the lack of theoretically derived interventions.
Typically researchers assess the effects of a program, such as ju-
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venile probation, without sufficient attention to the mechanisms
thought to link that program with criminal behavior. Such a
program could be based on deterrence theory, in which supervision and sanctions play a large role. Alternatively, it could be
based on modeling or learning theory, in which the affective
ties between the caseworker and the probationer are emphasized. Moreover, policymakers and practitioners generally prefer to individualize rather than standardize treatments-to do
whatever appears to work without regard to theory. 2 The result
of such interventions is often uninterpretable. It is also difficult,
though not impossible, to make valid inferences about the effects of mediating social-psychological processes that occur after
randomization. 5 Despite these barriers, it is certainly possible
to structure theoretically derived interventions and to distinguish between such disparate theories as those found in the labeling, deterrence, differential association, and social control
traditions.
2. External Validity

The primary weakness of previous desistance analyses for
policy purposes has been external validity or generalizability.
Many interventions and evaluations have been based on pilot
programs that drew subjects from rather narrow officiallydefined offender subgroups, such as heroin users in New York
City.34 Nevertheless, this difficulty is neither unique to nor in-

herent in investigations of desistance. A well-designed employment program and a long-term follow-up on a national
probability sample of prison releasees, for example, would certainly constitute a viable research project. The results of this
type of study would generalize to a broad population of interest
and could offer specific policy recommendations.
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3. Secret Deviance
The desistance researcher must typically rely on officiallydefined deviant populations. Yet prison populations clearly
represent a subset of all law violators and the desistance process
may differ for those who have never been formally labeled. One
might speculate, for example, that the effects of adult social
bonds to work and family differ among those formally labeled in
comparison to those not stigmatized by official deviant status.
III. PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE DESISTANCE ANALYSIS
A. EARLY DESISTANCE MODELS

We are not the first to make these points: criminologists
have long suspected that the causes of crime and the causes of
desistance may be asymmetrical. In tracing the history of theory
and research on desistance, the first task is to arrive at a meaningful definition. The concept has a long lineage in criminology, though few theorists or researchers used the term until the
1970s.35 Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck spoke of "maturation,"
"cessation," or "reformation" as a process quite different from
the genesis of delinquency or criminality. 36 Sutherland used the
term "reformation" as well, 3 7 both- as a putative justification for
punishment and as a constructive process of character reorganization. 9 The latter process, Sutherland argued, could be
explained by his differential association theory of crime and his
group conflict theory of the criminal code. Reformation for
Sutherland results when the offender assimilates the values and
culture of the group responsible for the laws, or when that
group "assimilates the criminal. 40
Though David Matza's theory of delinquency and drift41 was
never intended to explain the behavior of the "compulsive or
MARVIN WOLFGANG ET AL., DEJNQUENCYIN ABIRTH COHORT

GLUEcK & GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra note
GLUECK, LATER CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra note 1, at 98, 106.
7SUTERLAND, supranote 1, at 357.

"Id.
"Id. at 36-64.
'0Id.
at 364.
4

' DAVID MATZA, DELUNQUENCYANDDRIFT

27(1964).

44 (1972).
1, at 257; GLUECK &
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committed delinquent,"42 much less the adult criminal, it provides conceptual tools that generalize to the study of desistance
among these groups. 43 "Maturational reform," Matza's term for
the age-graded desistance process, connotes a life-course explaMatza's "drift" theory is
nation of crime and desistance."
founded on an episodic view of crime: "delinquency is a status
and delinquents are incumbents who intermittently act out a
role. 45 Most delinquent youth spend long periods of time in a
state of desistance that is only occasionally punctuated by delinquent activities. Over time, with age and increasing work and
family responsibilities, most will eventually enter a permanent
state of desistance. 5
More recently new models of desistance have been developed based on economic choice,47 or choice plus a combination
of sociological and social-psychological indicators.48 In these
models, situational factors such as negative criminal experiences
and life events such as marriage cause offenders to re-evaluate
their readiness to commit crime. Although these theories are
usually tested with observational data, many of the mechanisms
might easily be translated into manipulable interventions such
as financial aid to releasees.
B. THE CAREER PARADIGM

Today, the concept of desistance from crime is most commonly associated with the study of "chronic offenders,, 49 "career

42

Id. at 30.

3

Id. at 81.

44 Id.

at 22-26.

" Id. at 26.

" ROBERT J.

SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MA19NG: PATHWAYS AND

TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 217-30 (1993); NEAL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS 119,

125 (1996).
See Pezzin, supranote 2, at 33.
48Ronald V. Clark & Derek B. Cornish, Modeling Offenders'Decisions:A Frameworkfor
Research and Policy, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 147, 168
(M. Tonry & N. Morris eds., 1985); Maurice Cusson & Pierre Pinsonneault, The Decision to Give Up Crime, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL 72, 74 (D.B. Cornish & R.V. Clarke
eds.,49 1986); Shover & Thompson, supra note 2, at 93.
WOLFGANGETAL., supra note 35 at 88.
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criminals," and the criminal career perspective more generally."
The career paradigm suggests that criminal activities follow distinct patterns and introduces concepts such as age of "onset,"
"persistence," and "desistance" to describe these patterns.5 1
The career concept has provoked a rancorous debate surrounding desistance. As Wolfgang et al. acknowledge, 2 and
Hirschi and Gottfredson criticize,53 the concept of desistance
appears to imply a criminal career. For Hirschi and Gottfredson, the term "career" connotes specialization in particular offenses and escalation in offense severity over time. 4 Since
empirical research generally reveals versatility rather than specialization in offending 55 and decreasing severity rather than escalation with age,56 Hirschi, Gottfredson, and other critics of the
paradigm argue that no new insights are gained by conceiving
of crime as a career. 7 Proponents of the career perspective, in
contrast, maintain that no escalation in seriousness or specialization is implied by the term "career" and that the predictors of
participation differ empirically from the predictors of onset and
desistance. 8
This paper does not engage the criminal career debate, except insofar as it bears on the question of symmetric causation.
If crime is conceptualized as a social event in the life course,59
desistance can be conceptualized in a number of ways: (1) as
o Alfred Blumstein et al., Criminal Career Research: Its Value for Criminology, 26
CRmINOLOGY 1, 1-36 (1988).
-"Michael Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi, Science, Public Policy, and the CareerParadigm, 26 CRIMuNOLOGY 37, 40 (1988).
52WOLFGANG ETAL, supra note 35, at 251.
" Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanationof Crime, 89 AM. J.
SocAoLorY 552-84 (1983).
Id. at 574-78.
"Michael J. Hindelang, Age, Sex, and the Versatility of Delinquent Involvements, 18
Soc. PROBS. 522, 522 (1971); Malcolm W. Klein, Offence Specialisation and Versatility
amongJuveniles,24 BRrr.J. CRIMINOLOGY 185, 185 (1984).
SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, JUVENILE DELNQUENTS GRowN Up 89
(1940).
57GOTFREDSON & HIRscmI, supra note 25, at 241 (1990).
s Alfred Blumstein et al., Longitudinaland Criminal CareerResearch: Further Clarifications, 26 CRIMNOLOGY 57, 60 (1988).
" John Hagan & Alberto Palloni, Crimes as Social Events in the Life Course: Reconceivinga CriminologicalControversy, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 87, 87-100 (1988).
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simple non-crime, a behavioral state of indeterminate duration
characterized by the absence of criminal events; (2) as noncrime conditional on prior commission of crime (e.g. one must
first offend in order to desist); or, (3) as non-crime forever, a
more-or-less permanent behavioral state characterized by the
absence of criminal events. In this paper we have been primarily concerned with the latter two conceptions of desistance.
C.. FUTURE DESISTANCE ANALYSIS

1. Randomized Experimentation

We have already learned a great deal from the few controlled experiments conducted with ex-offenders, 6° though such
studies have historically examined rather circumscribed economic questions. To unravel the causes of desistance, further
randomized experimentation for both juvenile and adult offenders is crucial. We therefore conclude on a programmatic
note. We need not think of desistance programs as narrowly
limited to existing correctional practices or evaluation research
at the individual level. Desistance research can reasonably and
profitably examine a diverse range of questions at the situational, group, or even the societal level of analysis.
2. Comparative Work

Comparative research on desistance is prompted by empirical differences across nations in factors such as the relation between age and desistance. In Japan, for example, the peak age
of offending is earlier in adolescence and the decline in the late
teen years is steeper than in the United States.6 ' The rationale
for comparative analysis stems from potential American exceptionalism with regard to deviant behavior. The United States is
'o
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(1976); IRVING PILIAVIN & ROSEMARY GARTNER, THE IMPACT OF SUPPORTED WORK ON Ex-

132 (1981); PETER H. ROSSI ET AL., MONEY,
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 277-83 (Academic Press 1st ed. 1980).
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61Yutaka
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Harada, Adjustment to School, Life Course Transitions, and Changes in Delin-

quent Behavior in Japan, in 4 CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON AGING AND THE LIFE CYCLE 35,
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clearly the most punitive of the advanced Western societies,62
with an incarceration rate that exceeds Germany's rate by a factor of seven andJapan's rate by a factor of sixteen.63 This creates
disproportionately large officially-defined deviant populations.
Yet the United States lacks institutional mechanisms for integrating delinquents and reintegrating adult offenders into the
social and economic fabric of civil society.64, Many attribute Japan's low crime rates to cultural traditions of shaming and apology,0 but quite apart fromJapanese culture, a more rationalized
school-to-work transition facilitates the integration of youth into
adult society.& Experimental (or quasi-experimental) pilot programs in U.S. communities that are modeled on German or
Japanese structures might better isolate their causal effects, as
well as the residual effects of enduring cultural differences.
Comparative analysis may also qualify, extend, or refine generalizations based on the American case.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The goal of this paper has been to examine desistance
among criminal offenders, rather than to plumb the limits of
desistance research more generally. We believe that the same
principles underlying desistance research on crime are likely to
hold true for a wide range of deviant role-exits, such as substance use, homelessness, welfare receipt, non-traditional careers, perhaps even social-physiological phenomena such as
eating disorders.
We have motivated this discussion of desistance with the
Rubin/Holland causal model to highlight the extraordinary
barriers to causal inference in etiological investigations. We believe it is virtually impossible to assure mean independence in
62

NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL AS INDUSTRY 30-31 (Routledge 2d ed. 1994);

ELuorr CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: ANAAMERICAN CHALLENGE 28-29 (1985).
' Marc Mauer, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF INCARCERATION

1995, at 4 tbl.1 (1997).
" BRAITHWAITE, supra note 25, at 179.

6' Id. at 61-65.
6James E. Rosenbaum et al., Market and Network Theories of the Transitionfrom High
School to Work: Their Application to Industrialized Societies, 16 ANNUAL REV. OF Soc. 263,
282-85 (1990).
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observational work on the causes of crime, despite the often
brilliant methodological work-arounds devised by criminologists. If mean independence fails and we cannot account for selection into levels of our most critical independent variables,
then the assumption of "strong ignorability" also fails. Under
these conditions, any statistical solution to the fundamental
problem of causal inference is unwarranted. Thus, we remain
skeptical of the findings of etiological investigations.
As an alternative, we outline a case for increased theoretical
and empirical work on the problem of cessation or desistance
from crime. Desistance research better accounts for selectivity
because the treatment is more often within the hands of the researcher. Moreover, we have greater ethical and constitutional
license to intervene among admitted or convicted offenders and
are thus able to administer stronger treatments to target groups.
Among the challenges to learning more from desistance research are devising theoretically meaningful interventions and
expanding and ensuring external validity. Our intent is not to
discourage efforts for juveniles, but simply to acknowledge that
we currently lack effective technologies for this population.
More optimistically, desistance research could offer critical tests
of existing theory, the potential for new breakthroughs, and
concrete policy guidance.
Clearly, our advocacy of desistance research is not intended
to suggest that it has yet to be undertaken. Rather the problem
is that most such efforts are seriously flawed in terms of research
design, sampling strategy, and theoretical justifications for the
interventions being assessed. 67 Such investigations may be valuable for the administration of correctional or social services but
are essentially without any implication for desistance theory or
policy.
On the other hand, there are several desistance-oriented interventions whose evaluations have documented their content,
suggested their crime control potential and, in some cases,
specified the offenders for whom the interventions might be
' See Ted Palmer's excellent review of this literature and suggestions for future research in

A PROFILE OF CORREcTIONAL EFFEcTIvENEss AND NEW DIRECTIONS FOR

REsEARcH 10-21, 67-178 (1994).
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most effective. A partial list of these programs includes the National Supported Work Demonstration,68 the Baltimore Life
Study, ' the mulftisystemic therapy program,70 and the "Fixing
Broken Windows" police intervention. 7' There are also a few
studies (and specifications of theories) that imply the desistance
possibilities of yet-to-be implemented crime control interventions. Among these are the recent investigations of Rosenbaum
and Popkin 72 (suggesting possible desistance effects of residential change and its attendant opportunities) and Sampson and
Laub (addressing the impact of the GI Bill on the criminal behavior of its beneficiaries).73
That the degree of effectiveness of these interventions has
not yet been definitively established is not surprising since, with
few exceptions, they have received little systematic study following their initial exploration. This has been particularly true of
interventions providing offenders with material assistance, training, or opportunities.74 Though the reasons for this apparent
neglect have received little discussion, two considerations seem
relevant. Such interventions are likely to be expensive and politically sensitive, the latter a consequence of the potential costs
as well as the reluctance of citizens and politicians to "reward"
those who prey upon society's conventional members. Thus, if
these programs are shown to increase the probability of desistance from crime among offenders, policy makers face a potential dilemma. Should they support full implementation of these
programs they may face accusations that they reward the unwor-

MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., SUMMARY AND FINDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL SUPPORTED WoRKDEMONSTRATION 133 (1980).
69 Charles Mallar & Craig Thornton, TransitionalAid for Released Prisoners:Evidence

from
the LIFE Experiment, 13J. HUM. RESOURCES, Spring 1978, at 208, 233.
70
SCOTT HENGGELER & CHARLES BORDUIN, FAMILYTHERAPYAND BEYOND 55 (1990).
71GEORGE KELI G& CATHERINE COLES, FIXbNG BROKEN WINDOWS 23 (1996).

72James Rosenbaum & Susan Popkin, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF HOUSING
INTEGRATION 1 (1990).
7
' Robert Sampson &John Laub, Socioeconomic Achievement in the Life Course of DisadvantagedMen: Military Service as a TurningPoint, Circa 1940-1965, 61 AM. SOC. REv. 347,
363 (1996).
7' More punitive interventions, such as mandatory arrest for domestic abusers,
are frequently replicated. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific DeterrentEffects of ArrestforDomestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REv. 261, 268 (1984).
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thy for their criminal behavior; conversely, should they oppose
implementation, they may be criticized for withholding proven
crime control measures. Given the alternatives, policy makers
may turn to the evaluation of more politically acceptable experiments based on such factors as increased police manpower,
greater use of arrest, and longer prison sentences. Although
the merits of these policy measures cannot be dismissed out-ofhand, their promise seems no greater than and their costs no
less than the desistance strategy we suggest.
The merits of a desistance strategy apply as well to the advancement of academic knowledge as they do to urgent policy
imperatives. Perhaps the most fundamental asymmetry in the
study of crime and desistance is in our ability to intervene and
thus isolate the respective causes of these phenomena. If so, desistance research could further John Dewey's goal of moving social science from a "passive and accumulative" stance to an
active and productive one. 75 For Dewey, as for Rubin and Holland, "As far as we intentionally do and make, we shall know."7 6

" John Dewey, Social Science and Social Contro THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 29, 1931, at
276.
71Id. at 277.

